
The
Craft of Business Intelligence: An American View The
International Executive
F. W.
Rustmann, Jr.
July/August 1997 |
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Business
is war. And in war, it is
a matter of survival of the fittest.
In order to survive in today’s cutthroat business
environment, we must be properly armed.
And one of the most important arrows in the executive’s
quiver is accurate knowledge of competitors and their business
environment. In other
words, detailed knowledge of the enemy and the terrain of the
battlefield.
Every major country on earth recognizes the importance of intelligence
and employs and intelligence agency to collect it for them.
Over 2,500 years ago, the Chinese general Sun Tzu wrote: “If
you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of
a hundred battles. If you
know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will
also suffer a defeat. If
you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every
battle.” Frederick
The Great also expressed his opinion on the importance of intelligence
when he said: “It is
pardonable to be defeated, but never surprised.”
In today’s highly competitive business world it is
becoming more and more important to know your competition—know your
enemy—and, particularly in the international arena, to know your
battlefield. There are
minefields out there, and it is imperative to be able to identify and
avoid them. You can still
lose, even when armed with superior forces, if the terrain is against
you. Possessing accurate
intelligence is like having a flashlight in the dark.
It won’t remove any of the obstacles in your path, but it
will illuminate them so you will not stumble.
Realizing
the importance of good, solid intelligence is the first step toward
being prepared. The
second step is employing experts to collect that intelligence.
Some companies (W.R. Grace, AT&T, for example) have special
competitive intelligence units within their organization structure.
Others hire professional consultants from outside of the
organization to handle their intelligence collection requirements or
augment their efforts. Either
way, the craft of intelligence gathering and analysis is sufficiently
arcane that it should be left to the experts.
CIA case officers, for example, spend about a year attending
formal intelligence training courses before being released to employ
their skills abroad. Part
of what they learn is how to collect information discreetly through
the use of clandestine tradecraft methods, how to evaluate the sources
of that information, and how to report that information accurately,
objectively and dispassionately.
The FBI and some police departments
also run intelligence collection courses for their officers.
The main difference between the CIA training and the FBI/police
training is that the latter places more emphasis on techniques that
utilize the power of the badge, while the CIA employs a more covert
approach, relying more heavily on the use of cover and deniability to
assure a greater degree of discretion in its collection efforts.
Companies
employing in-house resources often have difficulty in obtaining
objective information because of problems with training, resources and
vested interests. Company
personnel are usually not trained in intelligence collection
techniques, the companies usually do not have the requisite resources
(computer databases, personal contacts, etc.) to collect the
information they need, and, finally, employees with a stake in the
company’s output will almost certainly lack the objectivity to
report information accurately, without bias.
The tendency is to paint pictures that support company policy
or please superiors. This
is precisely why professional intelligence consultants from outside
the organization should be called in to handle the most sensitive
intelligence gathering missions.
Generally, business intelligence can be broken down into three
main categories:
(1) Risk Analysis. This
is general background information that a company needs to know to
operate securely and effectively in an unfamiliar environment (usually
international) where economic, political, criminal, insurgent, labor
or other forces could adversely affect a company’s operations.
This is usually multi-source, analytical-type information.
It is designed to prepare a company for all eventualities, and
to allow it to operate with “no surprises."
(2)
Targeted Collection.
This
is specific information the company can use to increase its
productivity or market share. Market
analysis, due diligence, background investigations on potential
partners, employees and others, and competitor intelligence all fall
into this category.
(3)
Counterintelligence.
When
proprietary information on a company’s process, patent, copyright,
product, etc. is leaked, pirated, copied or outright stolen by a
competitor, there is a compelling need to plug the leak and prosecute
the offending parties. The
purpose of counterintelligence is to collect information that will
identify the spies within the company and the organization behind them
and to provide enough evidence to obtain convictions or press suits in
a court of law. It is
interesting to note that the
White House estimates the US economy loses $100 billion a year due to
the theft of proprietary information.
Within the US government, intelligence collection requirements
are generated by the White House, Pentagon, State, Justice and other
departments. In the
business world they are generated by company CEO’s and other senior
managers. These
individuals usually know exactly what information they ought to have
to insure the trouble-free efficient running of their businesses.
They may also know where to look for unique business
information that would give them the competitive edge they desire;
they just do not know how to go about collecting it.
Intelligence collection is a systematic process that requires
excellent analytical skills and employing proven methods that assure,
to the extent possible, the accuracy of the information obtained.
The process begins with the requirement.
What is the question? Exactly
what does the CEO want to know? This
is an important step in the process.
It forces the CEO to analyze the problem and refine it from
“I want to know everything there is to know about my competitor”
to “What is my competitor’s strategy to obtain the XYZ contract in
Jakarta?” or “What plans does my competitor have to enter the
widget market in Latin America?”
Once the requirement is defined, the next step is to do a
target analysis. In other
words, to examine the competitor organization with an eye toward
identifying where within the organization would the information be
normally held (marketing department, research and development staff,
legal department, etc.). Once
this is established, the scope is narrowed further down to the
individuals within the target department.
They are investigated and assessed to determine who would be
the most knowledgeable and accessible source.
Finally, when the target individual is selected, an operation
is designed to extract the information from him or her.
This usually requires the use of covert collection techniques
including elicitation, debriefing, the use of a suitable cover for the
inquiries, and other overt methods including database searches,
interviews of other knowledgeable sources, and the like.
Thus, the intelligence process, whether in government or
industry, involves four major steps:
(1)
defining the requirement;
(2)
collecting information on the requirement from all available
overt sources (databases, library research, etc.);
(3)
analyzing the overtly available information and organizing it
into a cogent preliminary report on the subject; and
(4)
identifying the gaps in the information and filling them
through the use of more targeted covert collection techniques, and
writing the final, comprehensive report.
This is the most efficient and efficacious approach to
intelligence gathering and analysis.
It is the technique used by the CIA and other government
intelligence agencies, and it is the proper way for industry to
collect business intelligence.
But all of this begs the question: If the collection of
business intelligence is sufficiently arcane as to be left to the
experts, and if the government is expert in the field, why then
won’t the government collect it for US industry?
After all, other countries, friends and foes alike, have been
aggressively involved in intelligence gathering activities targeted
against US industry for many years.
Some of these activities have even crossed the line into
illegal, state sponsored, industrial espionage.
(The main difference between industrial espionage and
competitive intelligence gathering is that the former uses illegal
collection methods like electronic monitoring, trespass, theft, etc.,
while the latter does not.)
In fact, there has been considerable debate, for instance,
within the government, and the CIA in particular, on this very issue.
It began in earnest in 1990 when the Soviet Union collapsed and
it was thought that the CIA could be retooled away from Soviet
collection activities to helping the failing US economy with needed
business intelligence. Debate
continues to this day. Unfortunately,
however, there is very little chance that the US government
(particularly the CIA and NSA) will ever get involved in the routine
collection of business intelligence for US industry.
The problem is that the very nature of clandestinely acquired
information makes it classified—not for dissemination to the general
public—because sensitive sources and collection methods must be
protected. So if the
decision were made to collect business information and disseminate it
to companies outside the intelligence community, to whom would the
information be entrusted? Certainly
not to all of the companies. But
then which ones? And to
whom within each company? Only
the CEO’s? Could they
be trusted not to disseminate the information down to the rank and
file? Probably not.
There is also a strong argument against the idea of diverting
scarce government intelligence gathering resources away from the
national defense to the private sector, and the ethical conundrum of
asking CIA case officers to spy for IBM rather than the White House.
This is not to say that the CIA and other law enforcement
agencies will not fight to prevent illegal industrial espionage in
this country, or that they would fail to alert major companies if they
learned, inter alia, that
some very unfair business practices (payment of bribes, etc.) were
hurting US companies’ chances to compete fairly in a particular
country. It only means
that the government will not develop and fund programs to collect
business intelligence for US companies.
Thus, if a US company wants to collect information that will
help it level the playing field and perhaps give it a competitive edge
over a foreign company, it must use its own resources.
Sadly, the proliferation of charlatans, crooks and, scam
artists has become a fact of life in the 1990s.
Outside US borders, this danger is even more profound.
Executives in countries lacking the laws, regulations,
safeguards, and reporting requirements in place in the US know that
their American counterparts all too often rely solely on limited
information and luck when dealing with foreigners.
Consequently, they are far more inclined to engage in
misrepresentation and deception in their business dealings with
Americans.
Managers who choose not to do their homework before they embark
on a course of action are doomed to failure.
Successful people always do their homework.
Years ago, when I was teaching the craft of intelligence to new
CIA officers down on “The Farm” I discussed the concept of
thorough preparation as the single most important key to success in
the intelligence business. I
explained that although all good operations officers certainly have
the ability to wing it when necessary, the best officers never go into
a situation with that intention.
They try to prepare for every possible eventuality in advance,
and then only have to improvise when a real unexpected curve is thrown
at them. That is good
advice for any business.
To quote Sun Tzu once again, he said: “To remain in ignorance of the
enemy’s condition simply because one grudges the outlay of a hundred
ounces of silver…is the height of inhumanity.”
Perhaps it would be more accurate if the word stupidity
were substituted for inhumanity.
The military advice that Sun Tzu espoused so long ago applies
equally to today’s business. Know
your own and your competitor’s capabilities, and know your
battlefield. Armed with
this knowledge, you cannot lose—the worst thing that can happen is
that you decide not to engage.
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