While Kingsley Guy’s Dec. 29 column, “Symbols from glory days are not a threat now,” correctly asserts the United States should not be “uneased” by Russia’s adoption of some Soviet and pre-Soviet national symbols, in the area of U.S. foreign policy toward Russia, the United States needs to recognize that part of Russia’s restoration will include pursuing its national interests abroad.

   To say this won’t be an easy task for the incoming Bush administration is an obvious understatement.  Nevertheless, the United States can develop a solid working relationship with Russia, provided it treats Russia like a large competitive power that will continue to exert its interests outside its present borders, such as in the Middle East.

   Russia recently expanded its military trading relationship with Iran.  Not only will this provide Iran with technology that could assist it in its nuclear program, but the move comes in the wake of an announcement by Russia that it plans to back out of a 1995 agreement to stop selling battlefield weapons to Iran.  While Russia is doing this partly because it needs to sell arms abroad for prosperity at home, it shows Russia is willing to deal with the anti-Western terrorist state to re-energize its interests and to be a competitor in the Mideast.

   This move is even more problematic as it comes during a time when Saddam Hussein not only boosted his anti-U.S. and anti-Israel rhetoric, but orchestrated the largest military parade since the end of the Gulf War.

   For the Bush administration, the answer involves taking advantage of a recent Gulf Cooperation Council initiative to coordinate their militaries to fend off an attack by Iran or Iraq, and to move forward with a proposed anti-missile system for the region that focuses on biological and chemical weapons.  However, the Gulf states expressed support for the Palestinians, so the U.S. role in the Middle East negotiations must be careful not to alienate our allies in the Gulf.

   The administration should also enlist Russia’s (and France’s) support to recreate the anti-Iraq coalition by emphasizing our mutual support against terrorism.  For the United States, terrorism in the Mideast continues to be a problem, and is centrally important in the Gulf because of oil.  For Russia, terrorism by predominantly Muslim states with ties to Central Asian countries is a problem.

   Re-energizing the coalition will not be easy, as the coalition has largely fallen apart.  However, re-energizing the coalition under the rubric of anti-terrorism and regional stability can forestall uncontrolled Russian involvement in the Middle East, while acknowledging the Russians as players in the region.  Colin Powell’s former role as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Persian Gulf War provides powerful credentials. 

   We shouldn’t be surprised that a country as large and complex as Russia seeks to re-engage abroad as it continues to stabilize and consolidate at home.  The question is not whether the old Soviet Empire will re-emerge; it will not.  The question is where and how Russia’s re-emerging centralized government and authoritarian-style leadership will compete with the United States in the international system, and how the United States should respond.